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C o d e s !  
EIGHT yeu. have elapsed since the last election to the Supreme 
S w i e ~  This was a period abwndiag in events of decisive moment. 
The k t  four p a d  in intensive &ort on the part of Soviet 
men and women to fdfd thc Third Five-Year Plaa The second four 
p r s  embrace the events of the war against the German and Japanese 
aggressors, tbe events of the Second World War. Undoubtedly, the 
war was the principal event in the past per id .  
r it would be wrong m think that the Second World War was s 
casual occurrence or tbe resdt of mistakes of any particular states- 
men, though mistakes undoubtedly were made. ActuaIly, the war 
was the k i t a b I e  r s d t  of the development of world economic and 
political forces on the basis of modern monopoly capidism. Marxists 
have declared more than once tbat the capitalist system of workl 
economy harbors dcmenn of general crises a d  armed adicrs and 
&at, hence, the development of world capitalism in om time proceeds 
not in the form of smooth and even progiess but through crises and 
miIi carp catastrophes. 
The fact is, that the unevenness of development of the capitalist 
countries usually 1 4 s  in time to violent disturbance of equilibrium 
in the world system of capiralism, that group of capitalist rxuntries 
whicb considers i d  worse provided t h  clthers witb mw nwals 
and markets usually making aaempo ro after the situation and repar- 
ticion the "spheres of iduence" in its favor by armed force. The 
result is a splirting of the capitdist world into two hostile camps and 
war between them. 
Perhaps military catastrophes might be avoided if it were possible 
for raw materials and markets to be periodically redistribud among 
the various countries in accordance witb their economic importanm, 
by agreement and peaceable serrlement But [bat is h p s i b l e  to do 
under present capitalist conditions af the development of world 
economy. 
Thus rhe Fim World War was the result af the first crisis of the 
capitalist system of world Pconomy, and the Second World war was 
the wult of a second crisis. 
Nature of War 
That does not mean of course that the Second World War is a 
copy of the kt. On the contrary, the Second World W ~ I  di%ers ma- 
teridy from the first in nature. It must be borne in mind h t  before 
attacking the Allied countries the principal fascist s ta tdermany ,  
japan and Imiy-destmyed the last vestiges of bourgeois demouatic 
Liberties at home, established a brutal terrorist regime in their own 
countries, rode roughshod over the principles of sovereignty and free 
development of small countries, prdaimed a policy of seizure of 
alien terrimries as their own policy and d e c l d  for a11 to hear that 
lhey were our for worId domination and the esrablishment of a fascist 
regime throughout the world, 
Moreover, by the seizure of Czechoslwia and of the central areas 
of China, the Axis states showed that they were prepared ro cauy 
out their rhr~at of enslaving aU freedom-loving nations. In view of 
this, unlike the First World War, the Second World Wlli against 
the Axis states from the very outset assumed the character of an anti* 
fascist war, a war of liberation, one the aim of which was also the 
restoration of democratic liberties. The entry of the Soviet Union 
inro rhe war against the Axis stat& could only enhance, and indeed 
did enhance, the anti-fascist and liberation character of the Second 
World War. 
It was on this basis that the anti-fascist coalition of rhe Soviet 
Union, the United States of Ameria, Great Brirain and other 
freedom-lwing states came into being--a coalition which subrpe- 
quendy pIayed a decisive part in defearing the armed forces of the 
Axis states. 
That is how matters stand as regards the origin and character of 
the Second World War. 
By now I should think everyone admits that the war really war 
not and could not have been an accident in the life of .nations, that 
a m a l l y  this war became the war of nations for their existence, and 
that for this reason it could not be a quick lightning affair. 
As regards our country, for it this war was the most bitter and 
arduous of all wars in the history of our Motherland. 
But the war was not only a curse. It was at the same time a p t  
school ia w h i h  9 the k e s  of the people wwe tried and tested. 
The war laid hare d facts and events in the xear and at the fmt, it 
tore of3 relenkdy all veils and coverings. which bad c o d e d  the 
me f a m  of rhc sutes, governments and parties and exposed them 
to view without a mask or embellishment, with alI their shorrcomings 
and merits, 
The war was something U e  an examination for our Soviet systwn, 
for wr State, for our Government, for our Communist Party, and it 
summed up the results of their work, saying to us as it were: "Here 
they are, your p p t  a d  organizations, their deeds md the& lives. 
h k  at them well and reward tbem according to heir deeds." 
This was one of the positive aspccw of war. 
Por us, for the voters, this circumstance is of great importance, for 
it helps us to make a speedy and objective appraid of the work of 
the P q  4 irs members and to draw c o r m  conclusions. At another 
time we would need to study the s e a  and reports of represent- 
atives of the Party. analyze them, compare their words wirh heir 
deeds, sum up, atid so forth. This involves complex and m t  work 
md &ere is no -tee that m M e s  will not be made. It is a 
diffmnr matter today when the war is over ad when the war itself 
bas ttsred the work of our organimions and Ieaders and summarid 
ie results, T&y, it is much easier for us to see how chins sthd 
md to arrive at correct conclusions. 
Results of War 
And so, what are the results of the war? 
Tkre is one chief result in wbich all other results h v e  their 
source. This result is t h  in the upshot of the war out enemies were 
defeat4 and we, togtther with our Allies, emerged the victors. W e  
concluded the war with complete vicrory over the enemies. That is 
the chief result of war. But tht  result is ~ O O  general and we canna 
stop ar tbat. Qf course, ro crush an enemy in a war like the Second 
World War, for which the history of mankind knew no padel, 
meant to achieve a world historic victory. AU tbat is me.  But still, 
it is only a general result aod we m o t  rest contart with that. In 
order to p p  the great historic importance of our vicrory we must 
examine the thing more conaedy. 
And so, how is our victory over our cnemiies ta be understdl 
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What is the sigdcanee of this victory as regards tbt State and che 
development of the internal form of our country? 
Sovtet System Passed Test 
Our victory mans, frrsc of all, rhat our Soviet s d a l  order has 
triumphed, rbat tbe Soviet social order has s u c c ~ y  passed the 
ordeal in the frre of wat and has proved its unquestionable vitality. 
As you know, it was chimed more than once iu the foreign press 
that the Soviet d order was a "'risky experiment" d o o d  to 
failure, that the Soviet order wus a "house of cards" which had no 
room in real life and had been imposed upon the people by the Cheka, 
and that a dight push from without was enough for this "house of 
d to collapse. 
Now we can say that the war refuted dl t h e  claim of the foeign 
press as groundless. The war showed that the Swit social order is 
a truly popular order springing from the deptbs of the people and 
enjoying their mighty support, that the Swier swid order is a form 
of o r p h t i w  of society which is perfectly srable and capable of 
enduring. 
More than that, there is no longer any question today whether the 
Soviet socd order is or is not capable of enduring, for after the object 
lessons of war none of the skeptics ventures any longer to voice 
doubn as to the vitality of the Soviet saeial order. The point now 
is rhat the Soviet social order has shown itself more spbk and 
c~pdble of enduring than a non-Soviet sacid order, hat the b i e r  
social order is a form of organization, a society superior to any 
non-Soviet &a1 order. 
Mulflnational Model Stoto 
Stcond, our victory means that our Soviet mte system hap 
triumphed, that our mdtinatioos1 Soviet State has s t 4  all the 
trials of war and has proved its vitality. 
As you know, prominent foreign press men have mare tban once 
gone on record to the effect that the Soviet multinational State was 
an "artificial, non-viable strucrure," rhat in event of any compliations, 
the disintegration of the Soviet Union would be inwirable, rhat the 
fate of Austria-Hungary await4 the Soviet Union. 
Today we can say that the war refuted these claims of the foreign 
prts as m d y  unfounded. The war showed chat the Soviet multi- 
national state system passed tbe test successfulIy, that it grew even 
up on a bourgeois foundation which seimulates sentiments of nationd 
distrust and national auhmity, but on the Soviet f d t h  which 
vn the contrary cultivates the sentiments of friendship and fraternal 
cokboration among the p p k s  of our Swe. 
As a matter of f a q  h r  the lessons d the war, these gentlemen 
no Ion= venture to deny that the Soviet sate system is apble  of 
enduring. Today it is no longer a question of rht vitality of the Sa- 
viet state system, for that vitality can no longer be doubted; the 
point now is that the Soviet seare system hap proved iwlf a mod4 
for a multinatiod sate, has proved that the Soviet state system is 
I a system of state o r p k t i m  in which tbe national question and 
the pmblem of cohbratiw among narions has been s d d  bet- 
ter than in any other multinational state. 
Triumph of Arms 
Third, our victory means that the Soviet armed forces bave 
triumphed, that our Red Army hs triumphed, that the Red Army 
bare up heroically under all the uiaIs of war, umIy mated tbe ar&a 
of our enemies and came om of the war as a victor. 
(Voice from fiw: "Udw #be badw~bi$ of Cmw& S&IU 
All r i se-s tmy,  fiolmgsd applsvse, k k g  to atr ovrxtion.) 
Now everyone, friend aa well as foe, admits that the Red Anny 
ill f d Y  &ern armamens, highly experienced commanding p m d  
and high moral and fighting qualities. It must not be forgotren tha! 
the Red A m y  is the army that utterly routed the German army 
which but yesterday was striking terror into the armies of the 
European states. 
Critics are Ftwer 
I r  s h d  be noted h a t  the ''critics" of the Red Army are growing 
h e r  and fewer. What is more, the foreign preis now more and 
more frequently contains items which note the fine qualities of the 
Elsd Army, the skill of its fighting men and commanders and the 
flawlessness of its strategy and tactics. That is but mmd. After 
the brilliant Red Army victories at Moscow and Stalmgrad, at Kursk 
and at Belgord, at Kiev and Kiravogmd, at Minsk and Bobrulslr, at 
kningrad and Tdinn, at Jassg and Lvov, on the Vistula and the 
Niemen, on the Danuh and the Oder. at Vienna and Berlin, it 
cannot but be admitted that the Red kmy is a first-class army from 
which much could be learned. (Stor~ns of apfllarpse. ) 
Such is our concrere undesmnding of our country's victory over 
its foes. 
Such in the main are the results of the war. 
It would k a mistake to think chat such a historic victory could 
have been won if the whok country had not prepared beforehand 
for active defctm. It would be no less mistaken to imagiae that such 
preparations could be carried through in a short time-in the space 
of some three or four years. It would be a stiU greater mistake to say 
that we won only owing m the gallantry of our troop. 
Of count. victory cannot be achieved without gabtry. Bur 
gallantry alone is not enough to vanquish an enemy who has a large 
army, hst& armaments, well-trained d m  &, and a fairly 
gd.organization of supplies. To meet the blow of such an enemy, 
M repulse him and then to inflict utter defeat upon him required, in 
addition to the matcHess gdhrry of our tmps, fully up-to-date 
armaments and adequate quantities of them as well as well-organized 
supplies in suficienr quantities. 
But that, ia tum, necessimted b a v w  in adequate amounts-- 
such elementary things as metal, for the manufacture of armamem, 
equipment and machinery for facrories, fuel to keep the factories 
and transport going, c o r n  for the manufacture of uniforms, and 
grain for supplying the Army. 
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Can it be &imed that before entering & Second World War mu 
munay d n d y  d e d  the necaaq  minimum material poten- 
tialities kt satisfying a11 these quiremena in the main? I rbhk 
i~ can. In order w prepare for this tremendous job we had ro awry 
out ebfee Five-Ytm Plans of national emnomic dwelopmcnt It was 
p&ly these cbree Five-Yem Plans hat helped us t i  create these 
materid potentialities. At any mte, our country's pit ion in this 
ie8pecf before thE Stcond World War, in 1940, was meral times 
h r  than it was More the First World War, in 1913, 
 re-prc~tlon for Defense 
What material potentialities did our counny command before 
the Second World War? 
To hdp you examine this p ink  I shaU have to report briefly on 
the work of the Communist Party in preparing our country for 
active defense. 
If we take the figures fm 1940, the eve of the Second World War, 
and compare them with the figures fa 1913-the eve of the Fhr 
World War-we get the following picture, 
In I913 our rraunay p d u c d  4,220,000 tons of pig iron, 4,230,- 
000 nuvi of steel, 29 million m s  of coal, nine million tons of oil, 
2 l,BOo,OOO mns of markerabk grain and 740 rhousand toas of raw 
Those were the material potentialities with which our couauy 
entered the First W d  War. 
Such was the emaomic buse of old Russia which could be drawn 
upon for prosecution of the war. 
Now as regards 1940. In the course of that year our come pro- 
d u d  15 million tom of pig iron, or nearly four t h  times mu& s 
in 1923; 18,300,000 rons of steel, or nearly four and one-half tima 
as much as in 1913; 164 &OD tons of mal  or more than five a d  
one-half times as much as in 1913; 31 million tons of oil, or nearly 
three and a - b d f  rime as much as in 1913; 38300,000 tom of 
marketable p i n ,  or nearIy 17 million tons more thaa in 1913; 
2,700,000 rons of raw cotton, or more than three and one-half times 
as much as in 1913. 
Those were che material potentialties with 
entered the Second World War. 
Such was the mono& base of h e  Soviet 
be drawn upon for prosecution of the war. 
The difference as you see is tremendous. 
which 
Union 
our 
whit 
Such an unprectdtntad increw in production cannot be reganled 
m the simple d n s d  development of a country from 6 d w d -  
ness to progress. It was a leap by which our Motherlaad was mm 
formed from a backward into an advanced country, from an agrarian 
into an industrid cwntry. 
Rw-Year Plons 
This historic transformation was accomplished in the course of 
three FiveYmr Plan priads, beginning with 1928, the hrst year of 
the First Pivc-Year PIm. Up to that time we h d  to concern our- 
selves with rehabilitating our ravaged industry and healing the 
wounds receive4 in the First World War and the Civil War. More- 
over, if we k a r  in mind that the First Five-Year Plan was fulfilId 
in four yam, d that the fdWmcnt of the Third Fiw-Year Plan 
was iaterrupd by wu in in fourth year, we hnd that it m k  only 
a b u t  13 years ro transform our country from an agrarian inra an 
industrial one. 
It amot  but be admitted that 13 years is an incredibly short 
period for the accomplishment of such an immcnsc ask. 
This it is that -lains the smrm of codicting comment which the 
publication of thex 6- produced at tbe b e  in the foceign 
press. Our friends decided that a "mirade" had taken place, wbie 
ow ill-wishers decIared that the Five-Year P b  were "Eofshevik 
propaganda" and the "tricks of the Chela." But since mtades do not 
happen, and the Cheka is not so powerful as to a W h  the laws of 
social development, ''public opinion" abroad had to accept facts. 
Methods of Indudrialization 
By what policy did rhe Communist Party succeed in providing 
these material potentialities ia the country in such a short t h e ?  
First of all, by the Soviet policy of industrializing the country. 
The Soviet mtrhd of industrializing the munq d h  radically 
fmm the capidst method of industrialization. h apifaIist coun- 
tries industrialization usually begins with light industry. S h  in 
light indmtrp W e r  investmwts are required and there is more 
rapid turnover of capital and since, funhermore, it is easier to d e  
a p d t  there than in heavy industry, fight indwrry semes as the hst 
abject of industrialization in thix countries 
Only afw a l a p  of much time, in the course of which light in- 
dustry accumutres p d t s  and concentrates them in banks, does the 
turn of heavy industry arrive and accumulated capid begin to be 
dd gradually m heavy industry in d a  to create conditions 
far its deptiopmerrt. 
But that is a lengthy proeeg~ requiring an nr#nsive pcriad of so- 
erd decades, in the w- of which * cwnaicr have to wait nnril 
light industry has dweioped and must make shift without heavy 
industry. NatufaltV, the Communist Partg c o d  not take this course. 
The h e w  that a war was looming, that rhc couarq could not 
be defended widmut hcavy industry, that the dm-t of heavy 
industry must be undereaken as soon as possible, that to be behind 
with this wodd mean to k wt. The P a y  remembered Lenin's 
words ro the e%m that without heavy industry it would be i m p -  
ible to uphold the country's independence, that without it the Soviet 
order might perish. 
Accordingly, the Communist Partg of our amnay r e j d  the 
"usual" course of industrialhtiotl and bcgan the work of Mumid- 
king the country by dewloping heavy industry. It was verg d i ih l t ,  
but not impossible, A valuable aid in this work was the nationaliza- 
tion of industry, and which made pd'bk the mpid accu- 
mulation and d e r  of funds to b o y  idustey. 
Tbm can be no doubt that without tbh it d have been im- 
possible m se-tllre aur country's tr8nSfo~tiOn into an hdwriaf 
country in such a short time. 
Agricultural Policy 
Second, by a poIicy of cdectivktion of agriculture. 
In order to do away with our backwardness in agriculture and w 
provide the country with greater quantities of markct&le en, 
cotton, d so forth, it was essmbl to p a  from d d c  pcasmt 
farming to large-de farming far only large-scale farming can make 
use of new machinery, apply dl h e  achievemeno of a g r o d c a l  
science and yield gream quantities of marketable produce. 
There are, however, two kiods of krge W p i r a l i s t  and 
collecrive. The Commuojst Party could nor adopt tbe =pitalist pnrth 
of development of agridnue, and not as a matter of principle alone 
but also becaw it implies too prolonged a development and involves 
prelimiaary rubtion of the pasants and their transf-dm info 
farm hands. Therefore, the Gmmunist Party took the path of the 
~ ~ i v i z a t i o n  of agriculture, the path of mting h@ 
fuming by uniting pasant farms into c o M v c  farms. 
The method of w ~ i v i z a t i o n  proved a bigbIp progressive method 
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d Y b e ~ ~ u s e  it T did nor involve the ruination of the peasang but 
k u s e  it permitted, within a fm years, the-covering of 
tbr -tire cormtry with large collective farms which are able to use 
new macdiuery, take advancage of all the achievements d agro- 
nomic science and give the country greater qurities of marketable 
nert is no doubt that without a collectivization policy we could 
not in such a short rime bave done away with the age-old bdward-  
ness of our agridture. 
It h o t  be said that the Party's poky encountered no resistance. 
Not only backward people, such as dways decry everything new, but 
many prominent members of the Parry as well, systematically dragged 
the Party backward and aid by hook or by c m k  m divert i r  to the 
"usual" capirmlisr path of development. All the anti-Party macbioa- 
rims of the Trotskyites and the Rightisq all their "activiti&" in 
sabotaging che measures of our Govement, ptusued the single aim 
of Erusuaring the Party's policy and obstructing the wort of indus- 
uialization and d k i v i z a t i o n .  But the Party did not yield eirher 
to the threats from one side or the wails from the other and ad- 
v+ codendy regardless of everything. 
It is K, the Party's credit that it did not pander to the backward, 
was not afraid to go against the tide and always retained its position 
as h e  leading force. There can be no doubr that without such hm- 
ntss and tenacity the Communist Party coukl not have upheld the 
poliq of industrializiig the country and mllectiviziog agriculture. 
Was the (krnrnunist Parry able to make proper use of the material 
pmtidities &us -red in order to develop war pduction and 
provide the Red b y  witb the weapons it needed? 
I think that it was able to do so and with maximum success. 
Industrial Record 
If we lave out of rmunt the hsr year of war, when rhe  ewcw 
tion of industry ta the East held up the development of war pro- 
duction, we lsee &at in the remaining duee years of the war the 
Party scored such s u m  as dowed it  nor only to furnish the 
fmt with h c i e n t  quantities of artillery, d i n e  guns, rifles, air- 
u - craft, tanks a d  ammunition, but to accumulate mrvea  Moreover, 
it M known that in qualiry our weapons were not ody nothing in- 
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ferior to the German but, taken on the whole, were ma& superior 
to them. 
I t  is known that during rhe last three yrars of war our d ia- 
dustry p@uOed m annual average of mote h u  30 h o d  tanks, ' 
self-propelled guns and armoxed cars. 
( S m  of *i#S#.) 
Furrher, it is hown that our W t  industry produced during 
the same period up to 40 thousand planes per year. 
( S t o w  of d#&#@.) 
It is dm b n  thar our ordnance industry, during this pericd, 
prcduced annually up to 120 t h o 4  gum of all d b c x s  
( * h e ) ,  up ro 450 thousand light and heavy machine guns 
( q # p h # ) ,  over 3 million rifles ( a p p k e ) ,  a b u t  ~ W O  d o n  
m y  guns ( * b ~ e ) .  
Lastly, it is known tbat our mortar induwy produced between 
1942 and 1944 an annual average up to 100 thousand mortars. 
( S t m y  dppfssrse. ) 
At the same time, naturally, there were manufactwd commen- 
surate quantities of artillery ammunition, various kinds of mmartar 
shells, at& bombs and rde and machine gun ammunition. 
It is known, for cnrample, tbat over 240 d o n  shells, bamb and 
mortar shells, and 7,400,000,000 rwnds of W ams ammunition 
were mmuhctud in 1944 alone. ( T h d m ~ r  e s p b ~ . )  
Such, in g e n . 4  is the picme of the supply of arms and ammuni- 
tion to the Red Army. 
As you see, it does not resemble the p h  which our army sup 
plies presented during the First World War when the front tx- 
perienced a chronic shortage of artillery and sheUP, whm the army 
was fighting without tanks and aircrafq and only one rae was issued 
to every three men. 
As regards the supply of the Red Army with ~rovisions and 
uniforms, it is known to all that far from experiwcing my shortage 
in this respect, the front actually had the r e s e m  it required. 
That is how matters sead with regard to tbe work of the (bm- 
munk Party of ow munay in the period up to the outbreak of war 
and during rhe war itself. 
- Plans for Future L3 
* 
NOW n few words p b ~ ~ t  the Gmmunisr ~any'i p h  bsvork 
for the immediate future. As is known these plans a& set forth in 
the new Pive-Yar PIM which is shortly to be endorsed The win- 
m 
dpd a i m  of the new F ~ Y W  plan ar i  to rehabilirace the rav'"ged 
~ R M  of tfie COUIIW, to rexore the prewar level in indmrrg and 
agriculture, d tbea w surpass this level in more or Iess m b m t d  
-. To say nothing of the fact that the rationing .system wilI 
shorrlp k a l d d u d  ( s m y ,  prolonged  he), special: a m -  
tian will be dewted m extending & production of consumer 
goods. to raising the living standard of the worlring people by 
s d i l y  Lowering the prices of all goods ( r t m y ,  proloaged ap- 
m e ) ,  aad t~ the widespread construction of all manner of 
scientific mew& iastitutions (foppIavr8) rbat can give science the 
opportunity ta develop its potentdites. (S~omry e p b s e . )  
I have no doubt thar if we give our scientists proper assistance 
they will h able in the near future not only to overtake but ta sur- 
pass the achievements of science beyond the boundaries of our 
country. (ProJorpged @+Mee ) 
As regards the plans for a longer period ahead, the Party means 
to organize a new mighty upsurge in the national economy, which 
would alIow us to increase our industrial production, for example, 
thee times over as compared with the prewar period. W e  must 
achieve a situation where our industry can prduce annunIly up to 
50 million tons of pig iron (pralanged @pknrse), up to 60 million 
tans of sted ( ~ o l o t ~ g  J appdawe), up to 5 0 0  m i l l i ~  tom of 4 
(proloag J applawe) and up to 60 million tons of oil (poioteg J 
e+s). Only under such conditions can we consider that put 
homeland will be guaranteed against all possible accidents. ( S t m y  
sppIme , )  That will take three more Five-Year Plans, I s h d d  
think, if not more. But it can be done and we must do it. (Stormy 
@ P ~ J # .  1 
Such is my brief report on the Communisr Party's work in the 
recmt past and its plans of work for the future. 
It is for you to judge how correctly the Party has been working 
and whether it couId not have worked kmr. 
Judgment by Voters 
There is a saying that victors are not judged (kpcgktw, a @ p h s ) ,  
that they should not be criticized, should not be checked on. That 
is not so. Victors can and shodd be judged (iangbrer, dpplr4usg), 
they can and should be criticized and checked upon. That is good 
not only for work, but for the victors themselves (hghber ,  rap. 
14 
tw, s p g h n )  ?he Communist Party of our country would not be 
worth m d  if it f d  to be criticid and cbscked upon. The 
Cammudst Party is prepad to accept the electors' verdict, 
(Sg- * b e . )  
In the election smuggle rhe Communist Party is not alone. Xt 
goes M the pb in a bloc witb non-Parry people. In by-gope days 
the Communists m t e d  non-Party p p l e  and ma-Party status with 
some misaust. This was due m the fact that the non-Party laag 
wus not infrequently used as a mmufIage by various bourgeoi 
That was the case in the p t .  But now we have different times. 
Our non-Parry peopk are now divided from the bourgeoisie by a 
kxicr Imm~ as the Soviet social order. This same barrier unites 
non-Party people with the Communists ia a single community of 
Soviet mcn and women. Living in this single community tbey strug- 
gIed together ro build up the might of our country, fought and shed 
heir blood together on the battle fmna for the sake of our cow- 
up, and in pamess worked togerkie~ to forge a victory over the 
enemies of our country and did forge that victory. The onlp dif- 
ference between them is that some belong to h e  Party, o h  do
nor. But that is a formal difference. The imporcant thing is that 
Stdh!") in nominating me to the Supreme Soviet. You need not 
doubt that I shall do my best to justify your trust. 


